I. IN SEARCH OF LAW'S GLOBAL LANGUAGES
Today's discourses about the nature, scope and regulatory reach of transnational law have far advanced from the time that Philip Jessup used the term in his Storrs Lectures at Yale Law School in 1956. 1 Written at a time when the Cold War was fast unfolding and the signs were hardly pointing towards any kind of united, globe-spanning legal order, Jessup's observations regarding the gaps left between public and private international law, at the time, did not seem to cause too much of a stir really, neither among international nor among private or commercial lawyers. 2 While the former were not particularly intrigued, private lawyers, especially those engaged in international commercial arbitration, seemed to have understood Jessup to state something rather quite obvious: by looking at the work of some of the great scholars in international and transnational commercial arbitration 3 we can find a common theme that has been running through these scholars' and practitioners' work for a long time. Connecting many of these scholars and practitioners, both in the past and today, 4 is the belief, that the ever-denser worldwide web of market relations has been generating its own rules of the game. 5 Pointing to the actual use of the rules in transnational commerce, such rules within this law merchant would be evaluated with regard to their practical functionality rather than on the basis of a jurisprudential test regarding their legal nature. 6 Today, transnational legal ordering has moved far beyond the confines of commercial norm-creation. As a consequence, our conceptual as well as empirical 6. See Calliess, supra note 4; Goldman, supra note 3; Klaus-Peter Berger, The New Law Merchant and the Global Market Place -A 21st Century View of Transnational Commercial Law, in THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1, 21 (Klaus Peter Berger ed., 2001) ("Today, the question is not whether 'common sense and reason are rules of law'. The lawmaking force of the community of merchants grows out of their awareness for reasonable approaches and common sense solutions to the ever changing patterns and challenges of the transnational economy outside the ambit of domestic laws.").
interest in the phenomena of transnational law and transnational regulatory governance has considerably expanded. 7 However, a largely private-law oriented understanding of transnational law remains important for our renewed assessment of where the field is headed. Given the phenomenal expansion of transnational regulatory regimes and the attending challenges in socio-legal and normative terms, transnational law offers itself as much more than a mere label or short-hand for legal principles, instruments, codifications and border-crossing soft law. Instead, transnational law as a particular framing approach invites a host of questions with regard to its "true" nature 8 , its regulatory applications, 9 and its politics, as well as its dimensions of institutional agency and legitimacy. 10 This observation is of relevance for today's investigations into different forms, manifestations, manifestos, or phenomena of transnational law, because it prompts an investigation of the normative stakes that arise with any attempt to rethink law's relationship to particular constituencies. At the same time, it is important to remember that this effort of placing a legal norm in context is not unique to the present debates around transnational law. The invocation of a legal principle, the interpretation of a law or the demarcation of a right always and unavoidably involved the contextualization of the principle, law or right. Each time one legal interpretation is given priority over another, the norm itself is placed and situated in a particular way in relation to its environment. One such way of localizing a principle, a law or a right can occur by framing it as belonging either into the universe of private or of public law. Another localization can occur with regard to domestic or international law. The use of both these forms of contextualization plays a central role in the current debates around the nature and regulatory function of transnational law, but -even more importantly -around transnational law's legitimacy. It is with regard to the legitimacy of transnational 9. With regard to commercial, constitutional and international law, see Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, Evolving, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 898, 913 (Jan Smits ed., 2nd ed. 2012).
10. Claire Cutler, Legal Pluralism as the "Common Sense" of Global Capitalism, 3 ONATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 719, 724 (2013); see, from an International Relations perspective, the observation by HEVINA S. DASHWOOD, THE RISE OF GLOBAL CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY. MINING AND THE SPREAD OF GLOBAL NORMS (2012), 6 stating, "The point is not so much that there has been away in authority away from the state to the private sector, or that the state is in retreat (Strange 1996) , but that the private sector has created a new transnational space (Ruggie 2004: 503). [. . .] The state still has a role to play, as this new global public domain is conceived as an 'increasingly institutionalized transnational arena of discourse, contestation, and action concerning the production of global public goods, involving private as well as public actors' (ibid: 504)." regulatory regimes that their alignment and localization in either public or private law seems to play a crucial role.
For lawyers in continental Europe, the belief that there is in fact a real dividing line between public and private law is central to the way legal systems are operating and law is being taught in universities throughout. 11 Attempts to question this line were made, for example, by German interest jurisprudence as well as American legal realist scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as part of a more comprehensive critique of the underlying ideas of legitimacy and of the politics associated with either public or private law. This can be illustrated, briefly, through Morris Cohen's work in the 1920s and 1930s, which highlighted the intricate connection between property and sovereignty on the one hand, 12 and the socio-political roots of contract, on the other. 13 According to Cohen, property and sovereignty, notions which according to him are regularly associated with the respective and distinct realms of private and public organization 14 , are in fact intimately connected by the state's endorsement and application of property rights, which result in no less than "confer[ring] sovereign power on our captains of industry and even more so on our captains of finance." 15 In other words, property rights, as created, recognized and mediated through law, illustrate their political nature, which in turn subjects them and their interpretation to political critique. 16 As regards contract, Cohen found that "[c]ontractualism in the law, that is, the view that in an ideally desirable system of law all obligation would arise out of the will of the individual contracting freely, rests not only on the will theory of contract but also on the political doctrine that all restraint is evil and the government is best which governs least." 17 Against this view, Cohen famously posited that "mere freedom as absence of restraint, without positive power to achieve what we deem good, is empty and of no real value. The freedom to make a million dollars is not worth a cent to one who is out of work. Nor is the freedom to starve, or to work for wages less than the minimum of subsistence, one that any rational being can prize -whatever learned courts may say to the contrary. Cohen's calling into question of a neat divide between allegedly private-nonpolitical and public-political dimensions of norms offers valuable insights for our navigation of present-day conceptual debates around the nature of transnational law and "transnational legal ordering." The prominence of private as well as publicprivate, so-called "hybrid" transnational regulatory regimes today 19 prompts our critical awareness of potentially one-sided presentations of alleged efficiency and practicality gains offered by private regulatory regimes in comparison to state-based, public government ones. 20 As the level of complexity in the organization of transnational governance regimes continues to increase, however, the importance of critical scrutiny with view to these regimes' accountability and legitimacy foundations grows as well, especially as the evidence regarding the effectiveness of transnational regulatory structures remains contested. As such, our current interest in transnational law must not be agnostic to these different camps of contestation.
The question then arises, where and, possibly, to which scholars we should turn in developing a conceptual framework. Whereas Jessup's 1956 book maintained an interesting balance between reflecting on the institutional changes that prompt our imagination beyond international law and international relations, on the one hand, and never fully articulated musings regarding the normative consequences of these changes, 21 on the other, the current discourse is considerably more charged and complex. The tension between an ever more complex socio-legal map of the institutional dimensions of transnational legal orders and the normative questions arising from them is even more accentuated than it was during the time Jessup wrote his book, as the interdisciplinary challenges arising from transnational law today relate to the complex institutional and procedural developments, which attract the attention of legal scholars, political scientists and international relations scholars, as well as sociologists, historians, anthropologists and even geographers. Meanwhile, transnational law's normative implications are debated among political theorists and political philosophers, democracy theorists and global justice and global ethics scholars. 22 only invites, but in fact urges us to connect current discussions about the institutional and normative challenges of border-crossing law and regulatory governance with deeper questions concerning the form and legitimacy of law. More than being merely another legal "field," transnational law, then, might better be understood as a methodological lens through which to scrutinize the emerging and evolving actors, norms and processes both within and beyond the confines of the nation-state, a region or a municipality, a group or any other form of collective. 23 Seen from this angle, the recent proposal made by Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer for a concept of "transnational legal ordering" emerges in the here described, contested realm of transnational law debates, which are, as we saw, part of a much larger investigation into law's relationship to globalization. 24 In the following pages, I will attempt to draw out the implications of these debates for a project such as Halliday's and Shaffer's by showing how proposals of transnational legalpolitical order design require us to critically interrogate the underlying assumptions that inform our model building. I will argue that one of the most pertinent assumptions in the transnational legal order (TLO) model is the idea of the state not only as a still relatively stable institutional environment but also as a reliable guarantor of public good delivery. In light of the state's historical and symbolic prominence in the Western legal and political imagination in both these respects 25 , there is a need to engage with the significance of the state, first, by revisiting a well-known story about the erosion of the welfare state under the conditions of globalization from the perspectives of both public and private law (II), before calling into question the alleged universality of the underlying assumptions regarding the state in that account (III). The next section will address concerns about the dominance of Rule of Law stories as they have been voiced by post-colonial scholars, before exploring the ways in which we trace the fragility of global law's "intimations" 26 in the emerging spaces of global legal imagination, and intervention (IV). In the concluding section, we will engage with the methodological consequences of the foregoing analysis of transnational regulatory arrangements. Understanding transnational law less as a neatly demarcated field of law, but rather as a methodological framework through which it might be possible to keep the historical (however parochial) stories in play without universalizing them and with a view to drawing on diverse sources and backgrounds in the categorization and classification of emerging transnational governance structures, the article will suggest the triad of actors, norms and processes as a robust and promising conceptual framework to capture the institutional and normative challenges arising from the transnationalization of law (V).
II. STATE TRANSFORMATION AND TRANSNATIONALIZATION: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW STORIES
Considering how many ways there are to tell the story of law's globalization, a promising approach might be to distinguish between the angles from which we tell these stories. One such angle might be that of the state, and more precisely that of the Western nation-state as reference and model, against which and in distinction from which legal-political formations on the global level are being described, analyzed, and analogized. That seems the manner in which constitutional law scholars have been approaching the issue -and with good reason. 27 Whether the prominence of state-based legal ordering in the twentieth century in the West is enough of a justification to continue to develop theories of law in a global context in relation to an, after all, historically contingent and, as a result, symbolically charged, notion of the state is another question. What Halliday and Shaffer offer us in this context is more promising than the cliché public lawyer invoking "the state" each time a concern regarding a regulatory regime's legitimacy is called into question. In their extremely careful and empirically based conceptualization of transnational legal orders, we find, instead, a public law approach being put to a test, that is to say, that Halliday and Shaffer set out to complement in a convincing manner the otherwise private law-based narratives around transnational law through the development of a public law-oriented and socio-legally grounded, analytical framework. Not only has such a complementing analysis been much needed ever since both progressive and conservative legal theorists battled each other over the value of the law merchant. But, even more importantly, perhaps, is the public law orientation of TLOs that allows us to trace the normative and ideological underpinnings of the ways in which different scholars localize and situate norms with regard to "public" or "private" law.
At least partly echoing this approach, some administrative lawyers have been creatively thinking about transporting established and well-tested categories from the domestic into the global (administrative) realm. 28 Apart from preventing us from being "empty-handed" when looking for the "what" and "where" of law on the global level, an analysis through analogy might prove productive in allowing us to 27 identify gaps and shortcomings in the translation process. Such gaps, it seems, are the more obvious the higher the political stakes of the legal field are or the more precarious the interests that come into view. Surely, labour law has been an oft-cited example of a field the erosion of which on the domestic level in terms of labour market flexibilization and decreasing union density seems largely to become exacerbated in relation to multinational companies' apparently free-wheeling activities around the globe. 29 In contrast to stories of translation or friction, as the case might be, accounts of "global law" might also arise in response to the proliferation of global phenomena and, indeed, globe-spanning regulatory challenges. The incredibly complex, multi-tiered and hyper-dynamic proliferation of so-called "9/11 law" might be a case in point. Created "in response," as it was argued, to the attacks on September 11th, 2001, the global "war against terror" has since become permanent and, problematically, "unremarkable." 30 Compare this to another global field of legal regulation, climate change law. Considering, in contrast to 9/11 law, a different set of contested and debated ideological and political stakes, 31 climate change governance has been at the center of attention, both domestically and globally. 32 The comparison between the "war against terror" and the equally unwieldy and multifaceted constellation of actors, norms and processes that make up transnational and global climate change governance, 33 are faced with. At the same time, this complexity does neither come "out of nowhere" nor were (or, in fact, are) such forms of legal-regulatory differentiation unknown to the modern state. 34 The ensuing questions regarding the continuity, parallels or analogies between state-internal and transnational transformations of regulatory governance are an important part of the unfolding investigation into the nature and scope of transnational law. Even in the absence of comprehensive or allsatisfying answers to some of these questions, we need to recognize the depth of connection between a legal (as well as sociological and political) analysis that has been directed at the (domestic 39. Pablo Solon, The Changing Geopolitics of Trade, FOCUS ON THE GLOBAL SOUTH, http://focusweb.org/content/changing-geopolitics-trade-old-and-new-players-slowdown (last visited December 12, 2015) (stating, "In its 18 years of existence, the situation of the WTO has changed. China and recently Russia have become members of the WTO. Today, the old "big four" have reduced their share to 49.9 percent of global exports of goods while the BRICS countries now represent 17.4 percent of the global market of commodities.").
"domestic" experiences with state transformation in trying to figure out adequate administrative solutions on the global level. With significant shifts occurring in terms of which domestic experiences-other than those of the U.S. or Europe as the usual suspects-one today would need to take seriously in order to get an adequate understanding of who does what in international political economy, 40 it is becoming clearer that traditional comparisons between the domestic state of things (regularly associated with the post-World War II nation and welfare state 41 ) and a global sphere have become rather questionable. Seen in connection with concurring globalizing developments from health scares, over security to an increasing instantiation of a post-national criminal law, 42 the changes in international political economy prompt a serious reconsideration and remaking of the analytical framing devices with which we can hope to capture "global" lawmaking and governance processes. "This opening frontier stands at the borders of several scholarly fields that only recently are becoming aware of benefits to increased traffic across their intellectual boundaries: international law, jurisprudence, international organizations (IOs) and international relations (IR), comparative politics, law and development, economic development, international human rights, globalization of law, international political economy, institutional economics, political philosophy, world society and world systems theories, an anthropology of global institutions, and a social psychology of legitimacy." 43 The task at hand is two-fold: on the one hand, we need to effectively trace the uploading but also the already highlighted theoretical and ideological replay of Western-originating concepts of economic governance in the global context at a time, where "varieties of capitalism," state-owned enterprises and the role of the state in governing the economy before, during and since the financial crisis are more contested than ever. 44 But, on the other hand, we will have to look elsewhere through the help of different conceptual lenses in order to learn from domestic administrative governance experiences of this or that country, without then being blind to novel institutional developments in the transnational realm. through an interaction of domestic, global and reciprocal norm-creation would constitute important components of a toolkit fit for such a purpose.
In light, however, of this observation and with a view to the host of disciplines already employed to cast light on global norm-making processes, the potential of a legal positivist, state-centered model of law might be limited. Seen, by contrast, through a lens of long-standing socio-legal critiques of legal-positivist accounts, law's seat at the table of interdisciplinary global governance studies seems less uncertain. That could particularly be true, taking into account the pertinent analysis that the Legal Realists brought to bear upon the interaction between allegedly separate spheres of political and economic power under the rubric of "public" versus "private." 46 With a view to the pressing governance challenges in global economic regulation today, it appears as if a critique of the categories and qualifications with which different spheres of political authority and, thus, of legitimacy, are being distinguished along the lines of public versus private or state versus market is crucial in that it offers insight into the connections as well as the continuities between struggles over power and democratic agency within and beyond the nation state's confines. 47 One way in which the already mentioned private law bias of some forms of transnational legal theory needs to be revisited is in relationship to the way in which we understand emerging transnational regulatory regimes on a normative level. It is important to recall that the transnational private and commercial lawyers of the 1960s saw little need to problematize the category "private" as such, because the main demarcating line was perceived to be running between (autonomous, transnational) "law" and the (potentially intervening, restraining) "state" rather than between "public" and "private" law. The relative triumph of this view on both the transnational and domestic levels 48 appears to continue to hold true today, if not unchallenged, then nevertheless undestroyed. 49 It is because of the pervasiveness of its characterization of transnational law as private law and the claim of it being an "autonomous" legal order 50 that we need to revisit the public/private distinction in 49. See Cutler, Common Sense, supra note 10. 50. Berger, supra note 6; GAILLARD, supra note 3. this context. On the level of historical development and symbolic weight, the distinction between public and private law remains significant, especially when we trace the power associated with each. 51 Meanwhile, scholars grounded in areas related to market governance such as contract, commercial or corporate law, considered private law as the appropriate governance framework when searching for a legal approach to address and structure emerging hybrid regulatory regimes. 52 This preference for private law occurs against the background of a long and contested history of demarcating spheres of public and private, state and market, as short-forms of normative universes, 53 and is, as such, tied to distinct associations regarding state order. In other words, the sympathies for a private law solution over a public law one make sense within the context of an established system of political references and routinized arguments that work so effectively precisely because what is at stake is presented as a practical choice, 54 while it is not openly making a statement about the nature (or the political value) of the legal order as such. But, how does the public/private divide play out in what Halliday and Shaffer describe as a "transnational legal order"? While the norm-making processes between the domestic and global levels, in turn, give rise to patterns of "transnational legal ordering" in both institutional and normative respects, 55 the world-creating effects of references to "private" or "public" appear to have become infinitely more difficult to track down. Where we are left without clearly identifiable or applicable constitutional texts, clearly identifiable and historically situated actors of recognized ideological stance, and without a judiciary to provide a forum for the space of political critique of law, the public/private distinction is becoming strangely amorphous. 56 Halliday and Shaffer, for the time being, seem to be able to escape both the need to having to choose between "public" and "private" as labels for particular TLOs and the challenge of satisfyingly responding to concerns around legitimacy, because the model elegantly navigates the divide without ever having to reject or overcome it. To the degree that we would find ourselves applying the label "private" to, say, only a segment or a particular level of a transnational regulatory regime in the form of a TLO, we could justify that with reference to the nature of the actors involved. While to endorse the "private" nature of a TLO in part or altogether would surely raise concerns with regard to the significance of this labeling, the prevailing ambivalence in that regard somehow displaces the problem. Already within legal theory debates on the nation-state level, legal realists and, later, feminist legal scholars had effectively deconstructed the public/private distinction as an instrument of domination. 57 Similarly, critical private law scholars were able to show that in both modern, so-called "mixed economies" (characterized by Keynesian marketshaping policies) 58 and in transnational regulatory regimes 59 the public-private distinction was often used to mask the legally regulated and political nature of allegedly self-regulating markets. 60 Now, confronted with a largely descriptive mapping of multilevel and recursively structured TLOs, the distinction between public and private, as it emerged in the context of an evolving modern nation-state 61 and its attending political problems, we need to reconceptualize the prerequisites for a practical use of the public/private distinction. Transnational regulatory governance, including the examples depicted within the TLO research project, is of a complexity today that the burning question remains whether such regimes can be adequately 57 .
Roscoe As markets are believed to pick up where (exhausted) national governments have left off, they form an integral part of a narrative of natural evolution. In this narrative, conflicts over goals of regulation and principles of political market governance are transposed into strategic options put forward by states engaged in global regulatory competition, or into preferences and choices by market participants and (global) consumers. In these accounts, markets are promoted to assume the role of regulators, however, without any regard to their constituted, legal nature, an insight gained so long ago, that the general amnesia that seems to have taken hold of the market fundamentalists could almost be forgiven. mapped along the delineations of public or private law. Whether we are concerned with standard-setting in different areas considered "technical" such as forestry, 62 electricity, 63 accounting, 64 labor 65 and environmental conditions within global supply chains, 66 or with the complex arrangements around climate change governance, 67 the task of understanding and conceptualizing such regimes against the background of the blurred lines of public and private law seems daunting. This interim finding, however, needs to be further assessed to the degree that we explain the emergence of TLOs as, at least in part, a response to the inadequacy of state-based regulatory instruments in the face of globalized production and dissemination regimes. 68 As a result, then, we are on shifting grounds when trying to mobilize the public/private distinction to highlight the ideological stakes in the context of transnational regime analysis. At the same time, however, the distinction continues to make its appearance in at least a number of the fast emerging and proliferating transnational regulatory regimes, for which an ever more differentiated vocabulary appears to be forthcoming. Notions such as "private authority" 69 or "Transnational Private Regulatory Governance" (TPRG) 70 ongoing conceptual analysis is directly tied to empirical field work, 71 while the resulting architecture along with the investigation of the arising normative challenges remain largely unsettled. 72 This is even more so the case when the emerging data sets complicate an analysis along the lines of public and private, because the constellations of actors defy a characterization according to such binaries. While that makes sense, arguably, when we think of public and private as adjectives to identify clearly allocated types of authority, the diffusion of public/private has an impact on our acquired routines of addressing the political stakes that the however contested application of the binary would regularly expose-domestically as well as transnationally. 73 The question, which poses itself with increasing urgency with the rise of more and more hybrid regulatory regimes from, say, the Equator Principles 74 to Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC), 75 concerns the ways in which the now available rich descriptive accounts of transnational governance may be exposed to a comprehensive normative critique.
Meanwhile, and the pervasiveness and timeliness of the TLO project is a powerful illustration of this, the evidence of the fast-evolving dynamics of transnational norm-creation not only speak for themselves but also provide a good deal of the substance of the ongoing theoretical enterprise. As a consequence, a lot of the current theory-design work, whether that is in the TLO project of Halliday and Shaffer, in Cassese's and his colleagues' impressive array of on-the-ground GAL studies, in Cafaggi's, Senden's and Scott's TPRG examples or in Eberlein's, Abbott's, Black's, Meidinger's and Wood's Transnational Business Governance Interactions, 76 is based on such a wealth of empirical data, that this tremendous contribution alone furthers our understanding of the actual operation of transnational regulatory regimes.
Engagements with many of the forms of transnational regulatory governance emerge from different starting points and with different, competing preferences, some of which express a deep-running concern about where to properly situate the 71 state in all of this, 77 while others place the question of politics in a still wider context of global ethics and democratic theory. 78 In Halliday's and Shaffer's concept of TLO, we find both a remarkable decentering of the state and its reconsideration as a crucial legal-political actor in a regulatory space marked by an interaction in between different levels of norm-making. Their depiction of recursivity provides us with a clearer view on the concrete forms of agency that are assumed by state and non-state actors in upward and downward oriented processes of norm creation. Instead of choosing in the debate between the state's "retreat 79 or "return" 80 , Halliday and Shaffer use the TLO concept with the connections between state transformation (the concrete drivers and symptoms of which need to be illustrated in more detail, however) and the functionally driven regulatory regimes, rather than forcing a decision between dismissing or resurrecting the state on more or less ideological terms. In that respect, the proposed idea of TLOs as framing devices for recursive norm-creation by states, transnational regimes and between them keeps the state "in play" while it avoids bringing the state "back in" as a global lion tamer.
In that regard, our discussion of the challenges of evaluating normative implications of the TLO framework echoes the observations already made by the abovementioned scholars and their work on different transnational regulatory governance formations. What we can see as a common theme throughout these investigations is the awareness of devising more fine-tuned analytical instruments to map the institutional dimensions much more effectively. But, what must interest us here are the ways in which these arrangements can be opened to normative critique. More directly, market-governance oriented regimes such as Equator Principles 81 or, say, corporate social responsibility frameworks built around the collaboration between IOs and private business 82 point to basic questions regarding justice, inequality, and distribution in a capitalist global system more directly than approaches that remain seemingly more attached to an analysis of geopolitical state agency. 83 But, at the same time, it is the growing complexity of transnational governance regimes, particularly in their elusiveness with regard to the public/private divide that renders 77 their normative evaluation increasingly difficult. As we have seen, the way we attach labels of "private" or "public" to different forms of regulatory governance might still say more about their institutional and normative entanglements in particular domestic regulatory contexts than effectively advance our understanding of proliferating patterns of transnational governance. Nevertheless, as these regimes reflect extensive forms of decentered, multi-tiered regulatory arrangements which result in flexible, evolving and fluid combinations of hard and soft, formal and informal regulatory elements, 84 the task of both mapping and critiquing them remains ever more urgent. Unsurprisingly, then, the observation that the current transnationalization of regulatory regimes in a globally functionally-differentiated society is only partially receptive to the same normative critique that the waning welfare states in Western democracies prompted in the 1980s, 85 is hardly novel. Instead, a timely critical project today is itself in need of a comprehensive grounding of its premises and starting points in a post-national, post-democratic context. 86 In other words, without the chess piece of the regulatory state and its redistributive politics as bargaining token, there is now a much greater need to develop a contextual critique within transnational regulatory regimes such as labour and human rights law. These fields require our attention for their normative and institutional stakes are particularly high, while the traditional, nation-state based reference points of "state" vs. "market" or "public" vs. "private" are of only limited value in mobilizing an effective normative assessment. 87 And so we must allow ourselves to take a step away from the "state" as reference point for modern political and legal theory. Stepping away, then, might 84 open the vista on different starting points for such theorizing, more problem-oriented than institution-based, more responsive than prescriptive, and more receptive to the wide range of world depictions than "inclusive" towards other disciplines' insights as if that there was much left of a safe ground to stand on. A legal theory thus conceived would take very little for granted, but instead attempt to embrace the complexity of globalized human affairs with little prejudice. We only need to turn our attention to the complex implications and legal challenges that have been arising from the tragic building collapse of the Rana Plaza garment factory outside Dhaka in 2013, 88 the workers' suicides of Apple Inc's Chinese contracting partner, Foxconn, 89 and from migrant workers' rights abuses and deaths during the stadium constructions for Fifa's 2022 Qatar World Cup, 90 to make us appreciate the need to think about the newly emerging spaces of interaction and of reflection, which cut across jurisdictional boundaries. The emergence of such spatialized cases calls into question any legalistic attempt to delineate institutional frameworks housed, in part, in the domestic sphere and, in part, in a transnational realm. Instead, as the example of the regulatory aftermath after the Spring 2013 building collapse of Rana Plaza highlights, the regimes here in question are "neither here nor there." 91 Alone, the range of actors who were involved in creating or otherwise shaping the Accord, from global and local unions, to governments, business representatives and the ILO, labor and human rights activists and advocacy, does not fit neatly on the traditional legal map. 92 III. REGULATORY GOVERNANCE: "EMBEDDED," "DISEMBEDDED," "TRANSNATIONALIZED," AND "WESTERN"
A striking feature of many of the currently circulating stories about the transformation of "the state" is that they are predominantly anchored in traditions of the Western nation-state. 93 As a result, the lessons we are likely to draw on when imagining the emerging global legal order, might turn out to be quite skewed towards experiences with "modernization" 94 and "civilization" 95 in the West and, as such, of only limited use with regard to the actually existing governance challenges that face a pluralist and diverse global world today. 96 More specifically, as scholars engage in sketching the institutional and normative challenges attending to an emerging, however fragmented global or transnational legal order, there is considerable risk that such efforts remain closely tied to a particular historical, socio-economic and political development. Emerging propositions, while embedded in a particular, Western reference system, become elevated to the level of universality. Unsurprisingly, after a long, protracted history of colonization and decolonization 97 and the establishment of a conflicted post-World War II order 98 , after the "Washington Consensus" 99 and in the context of the endless global "war against terror," 100 we need to turn our attention to the ideological and conceptual blind spots of these narratives, especially with regard to the implicit claims to universality of the depicted developments as well as to the potential transplantability of core concepts of the Rule of Law to "developing" countries. 101 of Law story undermines the assumption that there is an "off-the-shelf," rule-oflaw framework that lends itself in any quasi-scientific and pragmatic-technical sense as an export item for the various governance woes that are plaguing developing countries, post-conflict societies, and "failed" states around the world. 102 This critique, which emerges out of a wide array of critical theory, 103 post-colonial studies 104 and Third World Approaches to International Law 105 (TWAIL), posits the self-confident rendering of the rule-of-law account depicted above as an impressive illustration of benign ignorance and, in effect, arrogance.
In response, post-colonial scholars and, among them, TWAIL and other critical jurists have been hard at work at uncovering the discriminatory, exclusionary patterns of subordination, on the one hand, and the powerful routines of "normalizing" the exception, on the other. 106 Such resistance has been directed against the expansion of so-called "humanitarian interventions" 107 against the rhetorically entangled and institutionally immensely powerful "war against terror" 108 and against the flagrant global disparities that survive and continue to deepen -in spite of universal acclaims to the principle of sovereign equality. 109 As with other innovative theoretical advances, TWAIL's exact foundations and starting points are as elusive as the confines or boundaries of the project itself. Evolving as an internal critique to universalist stances in public international law, human rights law or the still dominant development concepts in association with promoting the Rule of Law as a globally applicable governance framework, TWAIL offers its greatest potential as a theoretically rigorous and empirically based undertaking that is both scholarly and activist, historically informed and at the same time not shying away from concrete political intervention. Even more remarkably then does it continue in being absent from most regular international law debates, let alone classroom curricula.
Despite its fluid center, 110 TWAIL's contribution to a provincialization of the Western narrative of the rise and subsequent fall of the democratic welfare state cannot be underestimated. The skewed nature of the account becomes only too obvious, once it is contrasted with parallel accounts of the passing of (international) time, 111 or with an expression of alienation or frustration regarding the alleged universality of ordering models based on the distinction between public and private, the state and the market, and so forth. 112 It is here that we (in the West) are only beginning to catch glimpses of what the world might actually look like. Building on these reflections, we must concern ourselves with an infinitely more complex and pluralist story, which engages questions of social, economic, political and legal order, but do so without choosing as a backdrop the allegedly sacrosanct story of the Rule of Law's adventurous time travel. Inevitably, such a story must be one about political agency and the conditions of its operation. But, what are the forms of such stories, and from which angle, and from whose perspective can they be told? How and, importantly, by whom?
IV. LOCATING THE RULE OF LAW: HOW EXPECTATIONS CREATE, ENACT AND FILL SPACES
To illustrate these challenges more clearly, we need to recognize the degree to which many of today's dominant globalization and Rule of Law narratives, as they emanate from public law and public international law discourses in the West, are in fact creating their own reference system. In other words, certain narratives become so powerful and rhetorically persuasive that they contribute to the design and furnishing of regulatory, argumentative, and epistemological spaces, which become material in the way that they house and govern future conversations about the ends and means of legal ordering. Because such discursively constructed spaces furnish iterations of legal order in general or of the Rule of Law in particular with elements of both legality and legitimacy usually in response to an in itself undeniable "problem" (security, climate change, risk, poverty), they are to a large degree immune against any internal critique. The three spaces depicted in the following illustrate three exemplary cases in which a rhetoric of "obvious necessity" serves to constitute a comprehensive order and internally coherent reference system. These examples include the debate over the use of force in the face of a perceived "humanitarian crisis" (and, ensuing, a global terrorist "threat"). At the center of this debate is the juxtaposition of constitutionalism and administration rhetorics that drive much of lawyers' present engagement with the conundrum of "global governance." Another ingredient in the debate is, however, the fight over an adequate role of the state in governing global markets. In order to deconstruct these material reference spaceshumanitarian intervention (1), global constitutionalism and global administrative law (2), and lex mercatoria versus state intervention (3)-we need to first clarify the starting points as well as the anchors of such a deconstruction. It should be obvious by now that the identified three spaces draw their oxygen from the Rule of Law trajectories outlined above. In other words, each of the here-discussed rhetorical spaces opens up against the backdrop of conventional rule-of-law narratives going unchallenged. In response, the proposal here is the following: if there is to be any chance for an effective deconstruction of the global world order imaginations which these three spaces inhabit, we need to provincialize the history and trajectory of the Western state and its laws by decentering and relativizing the existing accounts. One way of doing that might be to pay particular attention to what can be conceived as the significance of "our time," directing, in other words, our interest to the moments and the places in which questions about the evolving legal-political order are being asked so that, in turn, the bias of chosen perspectives, alleged landmark moments and key "events" can be made visible 113 and theories, perceptions and commitments may be engaged in dialogue from different perspectives. 114 The first step in this regard is an illumination of context, something that has an impressively long tradition and is testified to with encouraging intensity today in fields such as history 115 and political theory, 116 but continues to enjoy a weaker status in law and mainstream legal scholarship. With regard to the usual stories about the Rule of Law's trajectory towards a welfare state before being torn apart by the forces of economic globalization, the particularity of perspective becomes quite apparent once we place this trajectory in larger geopolitical context, allowing the internal story of Western state consolidation, industrial revolutions, economic growth and the "rights revolution" 117 to become an intimate dimension of the West's global history. 118 The contextualization of the most frequently referenced Rule of Law narratives allows a better understanding of where certain assertions are grounded. Against the background of alternative timelines and perspectives of storytelling, it becomes apparent that the commonly offered narratives of the relationship between the state and law are only "true" as long as we accept the following premises: 1. The 20 th century history of the state is correctly depicted as a progression from a formalist Rule of Law to a jurisgenerative, substantive law-issuing social and welfare state-prior to its demise in a competitive global market. In other words, this development can be described as one "from government to governance". 2. The nation-state's fate under the conditions of globalization is one of erosion and of "de-juridification." 3. There is a logical historical progression of modern state formation, consolidation of sovereignty, social modernization, emancipation of formerly unfree constituencies, juridification of all areas of societal activity (for better or worse), globalization of economic, cultural and social relations, the "end of history" (1989 ff) and, recently, "9/11" as "exception." 4. As far as non-Western populations are concerned, their history is appropriately captured in an account that traces the accession of former colonized peoples and nations to international statehood, governed by the principle of sovereign equality under the UN Charter. But, what if these premises were altogether traced back to a very particular, biased, and skewed way of historical narrative? How should we engage in critically revisiting the ways in which we used to narrate the story? A possible approach might be in identifying and highlighting not what keeps these narratives apart but what they share. In the context of investigating the meaning and operation of the Rule of Law, we may ask about the relationship between "legality" and "legitimacy" which might be, in perhaps very different manners, terminologies and associations nevertheless inherent to both dominant and alternative accounts?
Space 1: Humanitarian Intervention: The End of International Law, or Its Reinvention
The here-identified space is created and constituted by cutting through limitless, unbounded spheres that are depicted as the real world. In this world, because we have before been living in a dream and now need to wake up, everything is possible, you (who? someone? anyone?) only need to ask. 119 This space is, for example, that which is constituted in responding to a crisis. It is a space where Neo, quickly overcoming his shock, notes: "We need guns, lots of them. " Trinity 120 will reply that "no one has ever tried this before." We all know Neo's answer: "That's why it's going to work." 121 This constellation is a tragic illustration of the Kosovo "crisis" of international law, of the stretching of law's imagination in the name of legitimacy and of law's pushing back in the name of legality. 122 Thus, the ground had been laid for what Koskenniemi aptly coined international law's "turn to ethics." 123 what Anne Orford brilliantly deconstructed as international law's normalization of its exception 124 and what would eventually provide much of the slippery justificatory basis for repeated invocations of Kosovo as "precedent," whether in Iraq, 125 Syria 126 or elsewhere. The rhetorical avenues opened for international law's normalization, the embrace of a "war against terror" within the confines of international law would eventually not seem such a stretch anymore, only a few years later. 127 But, the problem is bigger still. As "law reform" and "assistance" crusades are on their way, growing day by day, the disconnection between law's legality and its imagined legitimacy, invoked by those who can due to their status, influence and power, continues to widen. By consequence, chances for a true provincialization of the rhetoric informing those efforts remain slim and skepticism or, at the least, caution appears warranted. After all, invocations of rule-of-law promotions in either developed or developing countries are not, nor could they ever be, objective accounts of existing conditions. Instead, all efforts of tracking, measuring, or accounting for the Rule of Law, historically, in comparison or along seemingly objective or merely technical yardsticks, are inevitably entangled in constructions of normative models of social order. Again, this is probably a very obvious observation, but one that merits being retained, particularly where assertions of the Rule of Law are embedded in narratives of growth, modernization, development, or legal reform, where they are, in other words, at the root of theory and policy design-debatable, implementable, and measurable. 128 At a time where public lawyers continue to mull over the implications of a transnational version of "government without governance," an abundance of comprehensive "assistance" programmes has been under way, invoking just about every challenge of liberal rights theory-now poignantly re-emerging in a context of intervention 129 , legal aid, 130 transitional justice and development. 131 But, does the undeniable existence of bias, power asymmetry and perverse effects rule out the validity of employing a formula such as the Rule of Law in order to create a discursive space where different background assumptions may be voiced? Is that not the gist of EP Thompson's famous last chapter in Whigs and Hunters? 132 And does this not illustrate the merits of a continued engagement with the Rule of Law as reference framework for competing understandings of legal, political and normative ordering, so that ". . .transnational Rule of Law discourse may be seen as Meta-TLO that frames and contextualizes all efforts to manage and regulate law, legitimacy, and conceptions of legality in the sphere of the transnational. . ."? 133
Space 2: Global Constitutionalism: Looking for the Wizard
Among the more recent proposals in the area of political-legal Global Governance theory, Global Constitutionalism has been attracting considerable attention and increasing pedigree. Debates around, in favor of, and against global constitutionalism regularly play out on two battlefields that echo, as it were, the already mentioned transnational replay of conceptual and doctrinal rhetoric and regulatory dilemmas between the nation state and the global sphere. For global constitutionalism, the battlefield is, on the one hand, the nation state, which serves as yardstick 132. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 266 (1975) (stating, "I am not starry-eyed about this at all. This has not been a star-struck book. I am insisting only upon the obvious point, which some modern Marxists have overlooked, that there is a difference between arbitrary power and the rule of law. We ought to expose the shams and inequities which may be concealed beneath this law. But the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the defence of the citizen from power's all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be an un-qualified good. To deny or belittle this good is, in this dangerous century when the resources and pretensions of power continue to enlarge, a desperate error of intellectual abstraction.").
133. Rajah, supra note 127, at 343.
and ultimate arbiter for any conception, thick or thin, substantive or procedural, of globe-spanning constitutionalism. 134 On the other hand, it is the global sphere itself, variably depicted as a space for which either we have no appropriate maps 135 or one, which by its inchoate, violent nature would be immune to any attempt of constitutionalization. In between and in counter-point to such assessments, we find sophisticated interventions that argue for a critical understanding of a constitutionalism that has come undone from the Western nation-state's edifice and must, instead, be searched for in the autopoetic, self-constitutive processes of functionally-differentiated social organization. 136 For the most part, however, these accounts still remain outside the mainstream discussion. Here, by contrast, it appears as if one could still hope to get away with line-drawing and by insisting that what should not be cannot be. 137 And so, similarly to Dorothy leading the way for a host of improbable hero impersonators, we might have to understand the walk along the yellow brick road to find the wizard as a necessary process to come to terms with our conflicted emotions of insecurity and hubris. 138 There might be more to say, especially as global constitutionalism appears to have become a mostly internal debate amongst a small number of international law scholars and even fewer political philosophers. Meanwhile, the same fate might just be in store for global administrative law. 139 
Space 3: Who Needs the Rule of Law? The Global Market Space and its lex mercatoria
The last rhetorical realm we look at is that of the infamous lex mercatoria, an allegedly autonomous legal order in its own right and, arguably, mostly bereft of politics. Lex mercatoria is the pure heaven (but on land and sea) of global commercial exchange, which is governed only by those rules that are accepted by those running the show. 140 Even against the background of tenacious, even tedious historical accounting of the degree of state agency in this entire circus, 141 the relevant parties could not seem to care less, whether it is in light of invocations of public law and accountability concerns 142 or claims pertaining to private law's inherent public protective and ultimately cosmopolitan dimensions. 143 And even the global financial crisis appears not to have put a dent into what continues to be, after all, just a big gamble, in Cincinnati and elsewhere. 144 Despite their apparent differences, there is something that cuts across our exposition of these spaces. Investigations into the confines, jurisdictions and demarcations of such spaces, for example, by those for or against humanitarian intervention, or those enthusiastic or horrified over a war against terror, as well as those intrigued or bored by invocations of global constitutionalism and, lastly those who think they can domesticate global capitalism, are mostly driven by a concern with the controlling agency, in our case with the laws (conventions, standards, agreements, and so forth) that govern a particular realm, a set of human interactions and institutional constellations. Our brief look at three such scenarios shows that the beauty continues to lie in the eyes of the beholder-and that is not just anyone.
V. METHODOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
But, where does this leave us in our attempt to develop a critique of transnational legal ordering? Much of the prevailing anxiety seems to result from a certain starting presumption that somewhere and somehow it could all be organized differently. That is, of course, a very public law perspective. This observation, however, is not just of idiosyncratic relevance, but one with considerable critical potential. As we have seen much of what governs is an almost pathological belief in the state as guarantor of (both negative and positive) rights, a facilitator of democratic public discourse, a schizophrenic protector of free markets and social welfare. It is on the rhetorical battleground of the Rule of Law that the competing contentions of law's role vis-à-vis society (encompassing individual rights bearers such as rich land owners or weak bargaining parties, transnational corporations, religious associations as well as divorcees, prison inmates, welfare recipients, and the terminally ill with or without a death wish) become entangled and the endless subject of negotiation. But, as long as the invocation of the concept of the Rule of Law retains even the slightest hint of a can-all, do-all institutional framework, there is in fact little hope that we may ever gain an even remotely adequate understanding of "laws and societies in global contexts." 145 As long as we conceive of the Rule of Law automatically (rather than ironically, historically self-consciously, and critically) as an institutionally evolved public law arrangement with particular institutional, procedural, and normative features, many of today's transnational law challenges-from climate change, human trafficking, workers' rights as human rights to corporate, commercial and contract governance standards-will remain outside the ambit of a routinized engagement with law. We will not be able to look at those regulatory challenges through the lens of legality/legitimacy as long as the conception of the Rule of Law as institutionalized, authoritative institutional arrangement to generate, enforce and adjudicate law dominates our imagination. 146
Embracing the Political Economy of Transnational Legal Ordering
Let us now try to draw some practical lessons from the work thus far. One could be that we ought to reverse or switch the perspective away from imagining (the rule of) law as an institutionalized form with a particular historical trajectory and normative aspiration. Such a switch in perspective can be achieved by radically moving away from a public law conception of the Rule of Law. But, what happens if you take the Rule of Law out of the hands of public lawyers? You are bound to find a much more sober, even hands-on account of the plurality and diversity of worldwide existing order-by-rules (law, non-law, not-yet law) systems which each require a close, contextual scrutiny to be properly assessed. 147 Such an approach might take you away from the apparent safeguard of a model of order and its (historically evolved, fought over and consolidated) institutional architecture and its (eternally contested and tirelessly disputed) normative underpinnings. In fact, such a socio-legal and legal pluralist engagement with and in the world reveals several surprising insights. Above all, what becomes apparent is a (potentially rather) unsettling continuity between accounts of fragmentation of legal orders promising certainty and predictability which are associated with globalization, 148 on the one hand, and an in fact quite longstanding critical engagement with the relationship of law to 145 society, on the other hand. 149 What becomes apparent as well, when looking at the way in which stories of a large-scale, globalization-induced loss of coherence, unity, and universality of the Rule of Law are being told, are the parallels between such discursive framings and the interests at stake, both in the domestic and the international context. 150 In light of the previous observations it is of course trite to remind us of the fact that stories of both success or failure are always told from a particular perspective and against the background of a specific, even if only implicit, understanding of what mattered, and what was at stake and for whom.
All this suggests, at least, that there is something very wrong with just about any attempt to neatly separate the spheres of the Rule of Law before and after or under the conditions of globalization. There is no fresh starting point; there are only competing justifications of why we, or anyone, should care. Instead, we are thrown back onto ourselves and both our prejudices and ignorance. We are, in other words, forced to appreciate the very ways in which we conceive of law and its relation to social ordering-while realizing that we must urgently enter into a dialogue with those who have been at the colonial and post-colonial receiving end of the Rule of Law's magic formula. Once we adopt a contextual and dialogical approach, narratives of before and after likely give way to more adequate analyses of the different, intersecting forms of institutional and normative ordering which we can find in different places at different times. As Frank Upham emphasized in an essay on the Rule of Law in the context of law & development, ". . .law is deeply contextual and [. . .] cannot be detached from its social and political environment. This is just as true in developed countries as it in developing countries, but this truth is absent from the new rule-of-law orthodoxy." 151 Upham's suggestion has significant consequences for the way in which we treat existing accounts of what has worked and what has not. Because it turns out that, in a context of extensive human resources and massive funds still being poured into development projects worldwide, the way in which we draw connections between domestically focused investigations into changes to the Rule of Law and the transnational employment of the concept in hundreds of development projects worldwide becomes crucial.
Context matters. As emphasized at various instances so far, the assertion of both the needs of a robust Rule of Law, stripped of all technicalities, as Hayek remarked, as well as of the challenges that might impede its achievement occurs-for the most part-in an abstract, ideological space. The Rule of Law is associated with processes and rights, with principles and values, and most often these can only be asserted in a heaven of pure legal concepts. 152 What is wanting, at least within the core confines of lawyers' day-in, day-out, teaching and research business, is the engagement with the endlessly messy, inchoate and inconsistent operation of norms, institutions, governance patterns-after 153 and before government 154 on the ground. Despite lawyers' quotidian interaction with the coincidental, accidental, and unpredictable, there still seems to be an unerring belief in the law somehow being above it all, supplying us with guidance, refuge and the promise that in the future all can be good.
By consequence, regardless of whether we try to trace back the fragile regulatory arrangement post-Rana Plaza to existing (and, dwindling) trajectories of labour law, 155 or make sense of corporate governance discourses before and after the 2008-2009 financial crisis, 156 it seems as if there is little value in carrying out such debates in abstract conceptual spaces alone. Instead, in both cases the real-world implications of the evolving regimes in labour and corporate law point to the importance of looking at the facts in play. Meanwhile, we see that such an interest in widening the conceptual range of one's field is driven by concrete interests, and those are different in labour and corporate governance. At the height of the debate over the global convergence or divergence of corporate governance standards, the opportunity to apply a sound political economy analysis to the fast-changing landscape of corporations and the law that governed them was not taken up by many company lawyers, while the material, the research, and the analysis were all right there-practically in front of them. Political economists, economic sociologists, even geographers, anthropologists and comparative legal sociologists had been hard at work to illustrate the way in which corporations can be seen as "institutions that pervade the social and material fabric of everyday life [. . .]" and how they "shape human experience not only in spectacular and disastrous ways but also in mundane, every day, ambivalent, and positive ways," 157 thus providing ample substance to decentre and de-polemicise the convergence vs. divergence debate. Meanwhile, no one would deny the fact that corporate governance is an important part of transnational normmaking and that we need to pay attention to the development of transnational actors, norms and processes in that regard. Meanwhile, however, there is little that suggests today that we could see any time soon a revival of interest in corporate governance theory that would be comparable to that of the late 1990s and early 2000s, 158 a debate that petered onwards for a while with a focus on issues such as executive compensation, "say on pay" as well as director versus shareholder primacy. So, in terms of being a popular field of critical, socio-legal analysis; it does not appear as if corporate governance today is "where the action is," if by action we mean hard-hitting analysis and critique of regulatory development in a crucial governance area with transnational impact. But, that is where the Rule of Law must be searched for today-just like we have to build labour law in and from cases such as Rana Plaza.
Territories and Spaces of the Transnational Rule(s) of Law
In light of these findings, what makes up the Rule of Law in a global context? How are we to imagine a transnational Rule of Law? The space in which this transnational variation of Rule of Law analysis occurs is multilayered; it is a construct to the degree that its architects evoke a governable, confined realm of human agency, institutional dynamics, and rule obedience. 159 But, it is also a discursive space of contention over values and, in the background of such disputes, over the power structures that inform, sustain, and control this space. Political scientists 160 and geographers 161 alike criticize the non-death of the neoliberal mantra that-seemingly unbroken since the "roaring Nineties"-continues to hold strong persuasive stance while legal sociologists ponder over the strange mix of institutional ambiguity and concrete impact of transnational power. 162 Lawyers have a lot of catching up to do in their effort to adequately penetrate and theorize these evolving transnational regulatory structures. Clearly, an important step would be to critically reflect on the role that one's own placement in either a private or public law universe is playing in the way we categorize and interpret transnational governance forms. With both international and domestic public lawyers-turned-global engaged in tireless and detailrich analyses of iterations of public authority, on the one hand, 163 and emerging forms of global administrative law structures, on the other, 164 private lawyers need to move beyond Hayek, but also Fuller, 165 in order to start asking (again 166 ) the hard questions as to who does what how and in whose interests. Maybe the regulatory aftermath of the global financial crisis and its continuing permutations can, for a little longer, still offer one of the much needed opportunities for a comprehensive political economy analysis of transnational financial law that takes the available historical factual accounts by finance experts 167 and banking and securities law scholars 168 as well as regulatory governance theorists 169 seriously. Yet, this space is not one for the specialists or planners against whom Hayek displayed such abhorrence. It is not a space that ought to be left to experts. 170 If it is true that transnational regulatory spaces are construction sites of an emerging, however fragmented legal order, then we are in need of a more sophisticated methodological approach. By showing continuities between legal realist, anti-formalist, and other alternative law critiques in the domestic context, on the one hand, and fragmentation anxieties in the global arena, on the other, we managed to emphasize the need to recognize law as always precarious, as always in danger of being hijacked, instrumentalized, silenced, or perverted. If transnational regulatory spaces bear the mark of the absence of wellknown (and often romanticized) institutional safeguards, then it appears obvious that neither a turning away from the transnational law project nor its appropriation through domestic transplants are an option. Instead, what is needed are means of relating the domestic and the global by conceiving of transnational law not as a distinct legal field, but as a reflective framework to consider different, co-existing and intersecting models of normative ordering.
As argued elsewhere, 171 the triad of A(ctors), N(orms) and P(rocesses) might offer possible translation and interaction categories to bridge different governance experiences and practices in a transnational context. The triad attempts not only to draw on, but to critically engage and provincialize, the insights, including the dominant and contesting narratives, regarding success, progress, as well as parochialism from Western Rule of Law traditions in the light of a much wider recognition of authority-bearing norms. Complementing this dimension is a complication of transnational regulatory spaces through law's confrontation with other disciplines' efforts of world-making. Building on long-standing advances in socio-legal studies, including the most welcome revival of a transnationally minded economic sociology of law 172 as well as drawing inspiration from historical and social theory research into transnational histories, lawyers are called upon to conceive of transnational regulatory spaces not as sites of emergency and ad-hoc regulation or crisis management, but as sites of interdisciplinary engagement and reflection. Through such an engagement, lawyers are likely to uncover the various political blind-spots and parochial associations of legal world construction as offered under the headings, for example, of global constitutionalism or global administrative law. Inevitably, such an approach will shake up vocabularies, terminology and conceptual frameworks 173 ; and, at the same time, such engagement very likely cannot remain descriptive or analytical, but will have to get its hands dirty in one way or the other.
What, then, is Transnational Law in relation to the ongoing search for a new, global Rule of Law, a global administrative law, global constitutionalism or calls for transnational legal order? Transnational Law is, we might say now, to a large degree an encounter of the familiar, but forgotten, or often not explicit, in unfamiliar, seemingly new contexts. In those contexts, we revisit the omissions, the blind spots, the exclusions and silenced voices, the failed protests and the aborted reforms. Half seriously, but that at least, legal positivism for our time must learn from and engage with a historically and geographically conscious pluralism-to be rightfully called legal positivism. For the time being, though, it seems that there is neither transnational law as law, nor legal positivism as transnational legal positivism. Instead, what we have is a candle burning on both ends. By critically reflecting on our way of applying "what we know" (from domestic law, from our cases and our jurisprudence) to a "different," "global" context, it becomes apparent that we are also calling into question the basis on which the application occurs. In that process, we likely grow insecure not only as to the solid foundations we are purportedly standing on, the norms, institutions, processes and actors, but also the laws, principles and values we think we can rely on as the DNA of our legal system. And, then, to the degree that we let skepticism about the existing legal order's firmness sneak in, are we pulling away the ladder on which we stand?
Dinner Won't Be Ready
For the time being, then, we find ourselves in the grip of a growing fear of falling into an abyss of neo-liberal nightmares of market-made norms, voluntary and consumer-monitored compliance mechanisms, of soft law and codes, of strangely intransparent but increasingly ubiquitous and influential expert committees and of just too much state-bashing in the name of an emerging autonomous legal order for world society. But, where to stop? Is going "back" to the domestic world of the (established, practiced and egalitarian) Rule of Law a serious option?
Would we really find it, waiting there for us-like Max finds his dinner when returning from where the Wild Things were?
